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Abstract. We study bottleneck routing games where the social cost is
determined by the worst congestion on any edge in the network. In the
literature, bottleneck games assume player utility costs determined by
the worst congested edge in their paths. However, the Nash equilibria
of such games are inefficient since the price of anarchy can be very high
and proportional to the size of the network. In order to obtain smaller
price of anarchy we introduce exponential bottleneck games where the
utility costs of the players are exponential functions of their congestions.
We find that exponential bottleneck games are very efficient and give
a poly-log bound on the price of anarchy: O(logL · log |E|), where L is
the largest path length in the players’ strategy sets and E is the set
of edges in the graph. By adjusting the exponential utility costs with
a logarithm we obtain games whose player costs are almost identical to
those in regular bottleneck games, and at the same time have the good
price of anarchy of exponential games.
1 Introduction
Motivated by the selfish behavior of entities in communication networks, we
study routing games in general networks where each packet’s path is controlled
independently by a selfish player. We consider non-cooperative games with N
players, where each player has a pure strategy profile from which it selfishly selects
a single path from a source node to a destination node such that the selected path
minimizes the player’s utility cost function (such games are also known as atomic
or unsplittable-flow games). We focus on bottleneck games where the objective
for the social outcome is to minimize C, the maximum congestion on any edge in
the network. Typically, the congestion on an edge is a non-decreasing function
on the number of paths that use the edge; here, we consider the congestion to
be simply the number of paths that use the edge.
Bottleneck congestion games have been studied in the literature [1–4] where
each player’s utility cost is the worst congestion on its path edges. In particular,
player i has utility cost function Ci = maxe∈pi Ce where pi is the path of the
player and Ce denotes the congestion of edge e. In [1] the authors observe that
bottleneck games are important in networks for various practical reasons. In
wireless networks the maximum congested edge is related to the lifetime of the
network since the nodes adjacent to high congestion edges transmit large number
2of packets which results to higher energy utilization. Thus, minimizing the max-
imum edge congestion immediately translates to longer network lifetime. High
congestion edges also result to congestion hot-spots in the network which may
slow down the performance of the whole network. Hot spots may also increase
the vulnerability of the network to malicious attacks which aim to to increase
the congestion of edges in the hope to bring down the network or degrade its
performance. Thus, minimizing the maximum congested edge results to hot-spot
avoidance and also to more secure networks.
Bottleneck games are also important from a theoretical point of view since the
maximum edge congestion is immediately related to the optimal packet schedul-
ing. In a seminal result, Leighton et al. [5] showed that there exist packet schedul-
ing algorithms that can deliver the packets along their chosen paths in time very
close to C+D, where D is the maximum chosen path length. When C ≫ D, the
congestion becomes the dominant factor in the packet scheduling performance.
Thus, smaller C immediately implies faster packet delivery time.
A natural problem that arises concerns the effect of the players’ selfishness on
the welfare of the whole network measured with the social cost C. We examine
the consequence of the selfish behavior in pure Nash equilibria which are stable
states of the game in which no player can unilaterally improve her situation. We
quantify the effect of selfishness with the price of anarchy (PoA) [6, 7], which
expresses how much larger is the worst social cost in a Nash equilibrium com-
pared to the social cost in the optimal coordinated solution. The price of anarchy
provides a measure for estimating how closely do Nash equilibria of bottleneck
routing games approximate the optimal C∗ of the respective coordinated routing
optimization problem.
Ideally, the price of anarchy should be small. However, the current literature
results have only provided weak bounds for bottleneck games. In [1] it is shown
that if the edge-congestion function is bounded by some polynomial with degree
d (with respect to the packets that use the edge) then PoA = O(|E|d), where E
is the set of edges in the graph. In [2] the authors consider the case d = 1 and
they show that PoA = O(L + log |V |), where L is the maximum path length in
the players strategies and V is the set of nodes. This bound is asymptotically
tight since there are game instances with PoA = Ω(L). Note that L ≤ |E|,
and further L may be significantly smaller than |E|. However, L can still be
proportional to the size of the graph, and thus the price of anarchy can be large.
1.1 Contributions
The lower bound in [2] suggests that in order to obtain better price of anarchy
in bottleneck games (where the social cost is the bottleneck edge C), we need to
consider alternative player utility cost functions. Towards this goal, we introduce
exponential bottleneck games whose social cost is the bottleneck C and the player
cost functions are exponential expressions of the player congestions along their
paths. These games can be easily converted to “almost” regular bottleneck games
that preserve the good price of anarchy of the exponential game
3In the exponential bottleneck games the player utilities are exponential func-
tions on the congestion of the edges along the chosen paths. In particular, the
player utility cost function for player i is: C˜i =
∑
e∈pi
2Ce. Note that the new
utility cost is a sum of exponential terms on the congestion of the edges in the
path (instead of the max that we described earlier). Using the new utility cost
functions we show that exponential games have always Nash equilibria which can
be obtained by best response dynamics. Furthermore, for the bottleneck social
cost C we prove that the price of anarchy is poly-log:
PoA = O(logL · log |E|), (1)
where L is the maximum path length in the players strategy set and E is the set
of edges in the graph. This price of anarchy bound is a significant improvement
over the price of anarchy from the regular utility cost functions described earlier.
It can be shown that exponential games can be easily converted to equivalent
games with player cost C′i which are closely related to the bottleneck cost Ci.
In particular, we can obtain equivalent games which have similar stabilization
properties while exactly preserving the price of anarchy by taking the monotonic
cost function C′i = log(C˜i). It holds that Ci ≤ C′i ≤ Ci + log n, where n is the
number of nodes in the graph. Thus, in the resulting game with utility cost C′i,
the player cost functions are very close to Ci, and also the price of anarchy is
the same as in Equation 1.
Exponential games are interesting variations of bottleneck games not only
because they can provide good price of anarchy but also because they represent
real-life problems. It has been shown that in wireless networks the power used
by individual nodes to transmit messages along an edge with guaranteed rate
is exponentially proportional to the flow of the edge. Thus, exponential game
equilibria represent also power game equilibria in wireless networks, where small
price of anarchy translates to small power utilization by the nodes. Exponential
cost functions on edge congestion have been used before in a different context
for online routing optimization problems [8][Chapter 13]. However, here we use
the exponential functions for the first time in the context of routing games.
Our technical proofs are based on the novel idea of proving the existence and
exploring properties of expansion chains of players and edges in Nash equilibria.
This technique differs significantly from the potential function analysis used in
other literature.
1.2 Related Work
Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [6] introduced the notion of price of anarchy
in the specific parallel link networks model in which they provide the bound
PoA = 3/2. Roughgarden and Tardos [9] provided the first result for splittable
flows in general networks in which they showed that PoA ≤ 4/3 for a player cost
which reflects to the sum of congestions of the edges of a path. Pure equilibria
with atomic flow have been studied in [2, 10–12] (our work fits into this category),
and with splittable flow in [13, 14, 9, 15]. Mixed equilibria with atomic flow have
been studied in [16–18,6, 19, 20, 7], and with splittable flow in [21, 22].
4Most of the work in the literature uses a cost metric measured as the sum
of congestions of all the edges of the player’s path [10, 14, 9, 15, 12]. Our work
differs from these approaches since we adopt the exponential metric for player
cost. The vast majority of the work on routing games has been performed for
parallel link networks, with only a few exceptions on general network topologies
[2, 10, 21, 13], which we consider here.
Our work is close to [2], where the authors consider the player cost Ci and
social cost C. They prove that the price of stability is 1. They show that the
price of anarchy is bounded by O(L + logn), where L is the maximum allowed
path length. They also prove that κ ≤ PoA ≤ c(κ2 + log2n), where κ is the size
of the largest edge-simple cycle in the graph and c is a constant. That work was
extended in [3, 4] to the C + D routing problem. Bottleneck congestion games
have also been studied in [1], where the authors consider the maximum conges-
tion metric in general networks with splittable and atomic flow (but without
considering path lengths). They prove the existence and non-uniqueness of equi-
libria in both the splittable and atomic flow models. They show that finding
the best Nash equilibrium that minimizes the social cost is a NP-hard problem.
Further, they show that the price of anarchy may be unbounded for specific edge
congestion functions.
2 Definitions
2.1 Path Routings
Consider an arbitrary graph G = (V,E) with nodes V and edges E. Let Π =
{pi1, . . . , piN} be a set of packets such that each pii has a source ui and destination
vi. A routing p = [p1, p2, · · · , pN ] is a collection of paths, where pi is a path for
packet pii from ui to vi. We will denote by E(pi) the set of edges in path pi.
Consider a particular routing p. The edge-congestion of an edge e, denoted Ce,
is the number of paths in p that use edge e. For any set of edges A ⊆ E, we will
denote by CA = maxe∈A Ce. For any path q, the path-congestion is Cq = CE(q).
For any path pi ∈ p, we will also use the notation Ci = Cpi . The network
congestion is C = CE , which is the maximum edge-congestion over all edges in
E.
We continue with definitions of exponential functions on congestion. Consider
a routing p. For any edge e, we will denote C˜e = 2
Ce . For any set of edges A ⊆ E,
we will denote C˜A =
∑
e∈A C˜e. For any path q, we will denote C˜q = C˜E(q). For
any path pi ∈ p we will denote C˜i = C˜pi . We denote the length (number of
edges) of any path q as |q|. Whenever necessary we will append (p) in the above
definitions to signify the dependance on routing p. For example, we will write
C(p) instead of C.
2.2 Routing Games
A routing game in graph G is a tuple R = (G,N ,P), where N is the set of N
players such that each corresponds to one of the packets pii with source ui and
5destination vi, and P are the strategies of the players. In the set P =
⋃
i∈N Pi
the subset Pi denotes the strategy set of player pii which a collection of available
paths in G for player pii from ui to vi. Any path p ∈ Pi is a pure strategy available
to player pii. A pure strategy profile is any routing p = [p1, p2, · · · , pN ], where
pi ∈ Pi. The longest path length in P is denoted L(P) = maxp∈P |p|. (When the
context is clear we will simply write L).
For game R and routing p, the social cost (or global cost) is a function of
routing p, and it is denoted SC(p). The player or local cost is also a function on
p denoted pci(p). We use the standard notation p−i to refer to the collection of
paths {p1, · · · , pi−1, pi+1, · · · , pN}, and (pi;p−i) as an alternative notation for p
which emphasizes the dependence on pi. Player pii is locally optimal (or stable)
in routing p if pci(p) ≤ pci(p′i;p−i) for all paths p′i ∈ Pi. A greedy move by a
player pii is any change of its path from pi to p
′
i which improves the player’s cost,
that is, pci(p) > pci(p
′
i;p−i). Best response dynamics are sequences of greedy
moves by players.
A routing p is in a Nash Equilibrium (we say p is a Nash-routing) if every
player is locally optimal. Nash-routings quantify the notion of a stable selfish
outcome. In the games that we study there could exist multiple Nash-routings.
A routing p∗ is an optimal pure strategy profile if it has minimum attainable
social cost: for any other pure strategy profile p, SC(p∗) ≤ SC(p).
We quantify the quality of the Nash-routings with the price of anarchy (PoA)
(sometimes referred to as the coordination ratio) and the price of stability (PoS).
Let P denote the set of distinct Nash-routings, and let SC∗ denote the social
cost of an optimal routing p∗. Then,
PoA = sup
p∈ P
SC(p)
SC∗
, PoS = inf
p∈ P
SC(p)
SC∗
.
3 Exponential Bottleneck Games and their Stability
Let R = (G,N ,P) be a routing game such that for any routing p the social cost
function is SC = C, and the player cost function is pci = C˜i. We refer to such
routing games as exponential bottleneck games.
We show that exponential games have always Nash-routings. We also show
that there are instances of exponential games that have multiple Nash-routings.
The existence of Nash routings relies on finding an appropriate potential function
that provides an ordering of the routings. Given an arbitrary initial state a
greedy move of a player can only give a new routing with smaller order. Thus,
best response dynamics (repeated greedy moves) converge to a routing where
no player can improve further, namely, they converge to a Nash-routing. The
potential function that we will use is: f(p) = C˜E(p). We show that any greedy
move gives a new routing with lower potential.
Lemma 1. If in routing p a player pii performs a greedy move, then the resulting
routing p′ has C˜E(p) > C˜E(p
′).
6Since the result of the potential function cannot be smaller than zero, Lemma
1 implies that best response dynamics converge to Nash-routings. Thus, we have:
Theorem 1. Every exponential game instance R = (G,N ,P) has a Nash-
routing.
We would like to note that there exist instances of exponential games that
have multiple Nash-routings. Next we bound the price of anarchy with respect
to the worst Nash-routing.
4 Price of Anarchy
We bound the price of anarchy in exponential bottleneck games. Consider an
exponential bottleneck routing game R = (G,N ,P). Let p = [p1, . . . , pN ] be an
arbitrary Nash-routing with social cost C; from Theorem 1 we know that p exists.
Let p∗ = [p∗1, . . . , p
∗
N ] represent the routing with coordinated optimal social cost
C∗. We will obtain an upper bound on the price of anarchy PoA ≤ C/C∗. In
the analysis, we will use several parameters as defined in the table below. The
proof relies on the notion of self-sufficient set of players.
Param. Definition
p,p∗ Nash routing and optimal routing, respectively
C,C∗ congestion in p and p∗, respectively
L maximum allowed path length in players’ strategy set P
L∗ longest path length in optimal routing p∗ (notice that L∗ ≤ L)
Ĉ, 2Ĉ upper bound on congestion, upper bound on player costs in p
l∗, l∗1 l
∗ = logL∗, l∗1 = log(L
∗ − 1) (logarithms are base 2)
Definition 1 (Self-sufficient player set). Consider an arbitrary set of play-
ers S in Nash-routing p. For each player pii ∈ S let qi be the routing where all
players in S have the same paths as in p except for player i whose path is now p∗i
(there are no paths in qi other than for players in S). We label the set of players
S as self-sufficient in p if for each pii ∈ S it holds pci(qi) ≥ pci(p). Namely, in
routing p player pii does not switch to optimal path p
∗
i only because of congestion
caused by players in S.
Trivially, in a Nash-routing, the set of all players is self-sufficient. If S is
not self-sufficient, then ∀i ∈ S, p∗i are called expansion edges because additional
players S′ must be present on them to guarantee the Nash-routing. We define
the notion of support sets:
Definition 2 (Support player set). If in Nash-routing p a set of players
S is not self-sufficient, then there is a (support) set of players S′ 6= ∅, where
S ∩ S′ = ∅, such that for each pii ∈ S it holds pci(qi) ≥ pci(p), where qi is the
routing where all players in S ∪S′ have the same paths as in p except for player
i whose path is now p∗i (there are no other paths in qi). Namely, in routing p
player pii does not switch to optimal path p
∗
i only because of congestion caused
by players in S ∪ S′.
7Note that there could be multiple support sets for a non self-sufficient set S
in Nash-routing p. If a set is not self-sufficient then there is a support set S′.
The set S ∪ S′ may not be self-sufficient either, which implies the existence of a
support set S′′. If S∪S′∪S′′ is not self-sufficient then there is some new support
set for it. The process repeats until we find a self-sufficient set. Every time we
find a new support set, the previous set grows and we call this expansion.
4.1 Outline of Proof
Let Ĉ = ⌈maxi log2 C˜i⌉. Let ‘game cost’ 2Ĉ denote the maximum cost of a
player in Nash-Routing p rounded to the nearest power of 2. Note that there
can be many possible Nash routings for a given game cost Ĉ. Furthermore the
bottleneck congestion (social cost) in Nash routing p is Ĉ ≥ C ≥ Ĉ − l∗, by
definition of the exponential player cost function. We will use Ĉ/C∗ to find the
upper bound on the PoA.
Let X be a (large) set of self-sufficient players. Define an expansion chain
rooted at X1 as an ordering X1 → X2 → . . .→ Xk of players in X by decreasing
cost levels (where a level is a range of costs as defined below) and satisfying the
following properties: 1) X =
⋃k
1 Xi where each Xi is a set of players at the same
cost level; 2) Xi
⋂
Xj = φ; 3) No prefix group of players
⋃j
1Xi is self-sufficient
for 1 ≤ j < k and at least one player from their support sets is in some Xt, t > j.
(Note that individual Xi’s might be self-sufficient but the union, starting from
X1 is not.) For example, note that X1’s support set might consist of players from
different levels in the chain; 4) Every player in Xi, i > 1 is in the support set of
some other Xj , j 6= i.
We label this as an expansion chainEC because starting withX1, the support
set of the
⋃
iXi’s is increasing by adding players of lower cost. However as we
keep expanding, eventually we will arrive at a set of players at some lowest cost
level k, who make the entire chain seen so far self-sufficient.
For a given game cost 2Ĉ , we are interested in finding the minimum sized
graph (number of edges) that supports both a socially optimal routing and Nash
equilibrium routing with characteristics C∗ and Ĉ. Since every Nash routing will
have an associated expansion chain, the equivalent goal is to find the minimum
sized expansion chain. Note that expansion chains bound the number of edges in
the graph. Each player in EC performs an essential function in the Nash-routing
by property 4 and thus the size of EC (number of players) in some sense relates
to the size of the graph G. More specifically, each player in EC is in the support
set for some other players and occupies the expansion edges for these players.
In our proof, we obtain a relationship between players on EC and the number
of expansion edges they occupy in G. We will show that any Nash-routing p
with Ĉ = Ω(logL∗) is guaranteed to have a minimum sized EC that is also very
large. Each Xi in this minimum EC must have a support set of players with
costs close to it. The number of stages in this EC grows with l∗, however the
support set and expansion edges for each subsequent Xi grows exponentially. By
finding the minimum sized EC for a given Ĉ, we then find the smallest graph G
8(with an exponentially large number of edges) with the given Price of Anarchy.
Equivalently, for a graph of given size, we can then compute the upper bound
on the PoA for any Nash routing.
We define our cost stages (cost levels) for expansion chains and player types
in the following manner: let S(i) denote the set of players in stage i, 1 ≤ i ≤ Ĉ
with player costs in range [2Ĉ−i+2, 2Ĉ−i+1]. In stage i, let A(i) denote the set of all
players occupying exactly one edge of congestion Ĉ−i+1, let B(i) denote the set
of all players whose maximum edge congestion C′ satisfies Ĉ−i ≥ C′ > Ĉ−i−l∗−1
and finally let D(i) = S(i)−A(i)−B(i). 1 is the highest stage and has at least
one player of type A, B or D by definition of Ĉ. Lower stages could be empty
of players.
4.2 Price of Anarchy Bound for C∗ = 1
For ease of exposition, assume C∗ = 1, i.e every player in the coordinated socially
optimal network (we will use the term network or game interchangeably with
the term routing) has a unique optimal path to its destination of length at most
L∗. The general C∗ case is proved later.
To find minimum sized expansion chains, we first need to determine if ex-
pansion chains of size > 1 exist for a given value of Ĉ. Related to this, we also
need to know how large is the set of these players. We first prove a sufficient
condition on Ĉ for expansion chains to exist. Subsequently, we will derive the
specific minimum sized expansion chain and its size.
Lemma 2. Any non-empty player set X(i) ⊆ {A(i)⋃B(i)⋃D(i)} is not self-
sufficient, where 1 ≤ i ≤ Ĉ−l∗1−11.
(Please see appendix for the proofs). This leads to
Theorem 2. Any subset of players S ⊆ {S(1)⋃S(2)⋃ . . .⋃S(k)} are not self-
sufficient, where k = Ĉ− l∗1−11. Equivalently there cannot exist any expansion
chains consisting only of players from the first k stages.
Since we are guaranteed the existence of at least one player from S(1) and
there exists a Nash-routing, there must be a self-sufficient set of players including
this player. By the above theorem, the expansion chain for this set and rooted
at stage 1 cannot terminate before stage k. Identifying this particular minimum
size expansion chain allows us to count the minimum number of edges in G and
hence an upper bound on the PoA.
We now want to find the minimum number of edges required to support
the Nash routing with game cost 2Ĉ . This corresponds to finding the smallest
expansion chain rooted at stage 1. By our definition, an expansion chain consists
of new players occupying the optimal path edges of players on the previous levels.
It would seem that chains should consist of type B players since they occupy
multiple edges and thus fewer players are required. However as the lemma below
shows it is players of type A that minimize the expansion edges.
9Consider an arbitrary player pi of type B in p occupying edgesE = {e1, e2, . . . , ek}
of non-increasing congestion c1 ≥ c2 ≥ . . . ck that are optimal edges (expansion
edges) of other players, where we assume maximum congestion c1 ≥ 2. We want
to answer the following question: Is there an alternate equilibrium/game contain-
ing player(s) with the same total equilibrium cost as pi, but requiring fewer edges
to support this equilibrium cost. Note that when comparing these two games,
the actual routing paths (i.e source-destinations) do not have to be the same.
All we need to show is the existence of an alternate game (even with different
source-destination pairs for the players) that has the same equilibrium cost.
In particular, consider an alternate game p′ in which pi is replaced by a
set P = {pi1, pi2, . . . , pik} of type A players occupying single edges of congestion
c1, c2, . . . , ck, where pi and the set P are also in equilibrium in their respective
games. The equilibrium cost of pi and set P is the same (
∑k
j=1 2
cj ) as they are
occupying edges of the same congestion. Since both pi in game p and the set of
players P are in equilibrium and occupying expansion edges of other players in
their respective games, C∗ = 1 implies they must have their own expansion edges
in their respective games. Suppose we can show that the number of expansion
edges required by the k players in P is at most those required by the single
player of type B. Since pi is an arbitrary type B player, this argument applied
recursively implies that all expansion edges in the game p should be occupied by
type A players to minimize the total number of expansion edges. Thus we will
have shown that any equilibrium with cost Ĉ can be supported with fewer total
players if they are of type A than if they are of type B. Let pi∗ and P ∗ denote
the expansion edges of pi and the set P respectively.
Lemma 3. |P ∗| ≤ |pi∗| for arbitrary players pi and set P with the same equilib-
rium cost.
As a consequence of lemma 3, we have
Lemma 4. For Ĉ > l∗+11, the expansion chain rooted in stage 1 and occupying
the minimum number of edges consists only of players of type A (other than the
root).
Next we derive the size of the smallest network required to support an equi-
librium congestion of Ĉ. Without loss of generality, we assume there exists at
least one type A player in stage 1, i.e a single edge of congestion Ĉ and derive the
minimum chain rooted at A(1). From lemma 4, there exists an expansion chain
rooted at A(1) with only type A players. Among all such expansion chains, the
one with the minimum number of players (equivalently edges, since each type A
player occupies a single edge) is defined below.
Theorem 3. ECmin, the expansion chain with minimum number of edges that
supports a self-sufficient equilibrium rooted at A(1) is defined by ECmin : A
(1) →
A(l
∗+2) → A(2l∗+3) → A(3l∗+4) → . . . → A(Ĉ−1). Every player in ECmin has
an optimal path whose length is the maximum allowed L∗. The depth of chain
ECmin is O(Ĉ/l
∗).
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ECmin defined in Theorem 3 is also the minimum sized chain when the root
players are from B(1) or D(1) although the number of edges required in the
supporting graph is slightly different as we see later. In these cases, all stages
(other than the root) in the minimum expansion chain consist of type A players
by lemma 4 and the proof of Theorem 3 is immediately applicable in choosing
the specific indices of the expansion stages required to support the equilibrium).
As shown later, however, the PoA is maximized when the chain is rooted at
A(1).
Theorem 4. When C∗ = 1, the upper bound κ on the Price of Anarchy PoA of
Nash-routing p is given by the minimum of 1) κ = O(logL∗) or 2) κ
(
log(κL∗)
) ≤
logL∗ · log |E|.
Can we get a larger upper bound on the POA if the expansion chain is rooted
at B(1)/D(1) instead of A(1)? To examine this, let Ĉ−q be the largest congestion
in p, q > 0. We need 2q such edges in order to satisfy the maximum player cost
of 2Ĉ . All these edges can be used as expansion edges for other players. From
the analysis in Theorem 4, we note that expansion between stages occurs at
a factorial rate. Thus using these 2q edges as high up in the chain as possible
(thereby reducing the need for new expansion edges) will minimize the expansion
rate. The best choice for q then is l∗. In this case, we have a single player pim in
equilibrium in p, occupying L∗ edges of congestion Ĉ − l∗. These L∗ edges are
also the optimal edges of pim, i.e its equilibrium and optimal paths are identical.
Hence the first stage of expansion in this chain is for the L∗(Ĉ − l∗ − 1) players
on the L∗ edges of pim. From this point on the minimum sized chain for this
graph is identical to the minimum sized chain ECmin defined above. The total
number of edges in this chain can be computed in a manner similar to above.
While the number of edges is smaller than ECmin, it can be shown that the PoA
is also smaller Ĉ − l∗. Hence the upper bound on the PoA is obtained using an
expansion chain rooted at A(1).
4.3 Price of Anarchy Bound for C∗ > 1
So far we have assumed the optimal bottleneck congestion C∗ = 1 in our deriva-
tions. We now show that increasing C∗ decreases the PoA and hence the previous
derivation is the upper bound. We first evaluate the impact of C∗ = M > 1 on
expansion chains. Having C∗ > 1 implies that more players can share expansion
edges and thus the rate of expansion as well as the depth of an expansion chain
(if it exists) should decrease. We first show that expansion chains exist even for
arbitrary C∗ =M .
Lemma 5. Any subset of players S ⊆ {S(1)⋃S(2)⋃ . . .⋃S(k)} are not self-
sufficient, where k : Ĉ − k > 8M + l∗1 + 2. Equivalently there cannot exist any
expansion chains consisting only of players from the first k stages.
Similarly Lemmas 3 and 4 can be suitably modified and the minimum sized
chain in this case has the same structure as defined in Theorem 3. Analogous to
11
the C∗ = 1 case, the maximum PoA occurs when ECmin is rooted at A
(1). We
calculate this PoA with C∗ =M , below.
Theorem 5. When C∗ =M , the upper bound κ on the Price of Anarchy PoA of
game p is given by the minimum of 1) κ = O( logL
∗
M
) or 2) κ(log(L∗κ)) ≤ l∗ log |E|
M
5 Conclusions
We show by carefully selecting appropriate player cost functions that the price
of anarchy of bottleneck routing games is poly-log with respect to the size of
the game parameters: O(logL · log |E|). A natural question that arises is what is
the impact of polynomial cost functions to the price of anarchy. Polynomial cost
functions with low degree give high price of anarchy. Consider the game instance
in the figure where the player cost is pci =
∑
e∈pi
Ce which is a linear function
on the congestion of the edges on the player’s path.
x1 y1
u v
xk−1 yk−1
x2 y2
p1, . . . , pk
k − 2
Nash Equilibrium with social cost k
x1 y1
u v
xk−1 yk−1
x2 y2
p2
p1
pk
p3
k − 2
Routing with optimal social cost 1
In this game there k players pi1, . . . , pik where all the players have source u and
destination v which are connected by edge e. The graph consists of k − 1 edge-
disjoint paths from u to v each of length k. There is a Nash equilibrium, depicted
in the left figure where every player chooses to use a path of length 1 on edge e.
This is an equilibrium because the cost of each player is k, while the cost of every
alternative path is also k. Since the congestion of edge e is k the social cost is
k. The optimal solution for the same routing problem is depicted in the right of
the figure. where every player uses a edge-disjoint path and thus the maximum
congestion on any edge is 1. Therefore, the price of anarchy is at least k. Since
we can choose k = Θ(
√
n), where n is the number of nodes in the graph, the
price of anarchy is Ω(
√
n).
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